Putin

Politics & The World

by Filip Rambousek

On the 30th of October, the EU has gone through with its promise to temporarily lift sanctions against Belarus. More specifically, the EU will for four months raise its travel ban on 170 individuals, as well as its asset freeze of three entities in Belarus.

The promise to raise these sanctions was a carrot dangled in front of Lukashenko before the recent elections. In exchange, Lukashenko had to respond with some degree of liberalisation of his regime.

In concrete terms, the EU demanded slightly more democratic elections, and a release of some political prisoners. Lukashenko made good on both expectations. In August, he released six political prisoners. Before the elections, he allowed the only opposition candidate, Tatsiana Karatkevich, to be interviewed by the main government newspaper. During the elections, the OSCE’s observes were met with fewer obstacles to carry out their work than previously. Overall, the OSCE cited “positive developments” in the Belarusian electoral process.

Still, Lukashenko has not suddenly become a dedicated democrat. The political prisoners, while physically out of jail, remain under close government supervision, with many of their civil liberties curtailed. Despite the improvements, we also cannot speak about democratic elections in Belarus. Belarusian civil society representatives complained about non-transparent vote counting. The OSCE’s head observer agreed, stating that “it is clear that Belarus still has a long way to go towards fulfilling its democratic commitments”.

But why should an authoritarian like Lukashenko, after 21 years in charge, and who even without the rigging of votes has the genuine support of around 60% of Belarusians, bother with pleasing the West? The answer is simple: Europe has changed, and its last dictator with it. In fact, Lukashenko has long lost the right to this moniker. This title has been, yet again, rightfully claimed by the leader of Russia. Putin’s regime, with its domestic repression and foreign aggression, currently represents the biggest threat to the EU, as well as the global order. In reality, he is now one of the “better” dictators in the authoritarian pantheon.

Lukashenko is a shrewd, cold pragmatist, whose only goal is to stay in power. He is very well aware of the threat that the new doctrine of Putinism presents to his position in Belarus. With his invasion of Ukraine, Putin has declared that he has the right to get involved in the internal affairs of any country with a Russian minority. Because of this, Belarus is obviously a prime candidate for the Russian army’s next trip abroad. To Lukashenko, a slight liberalisation of the regime represents a lesser evil, and a lesser threat to his power, than a further deterioration of his relations with the West and total dependency on Russia.

Lukashenko is therefore doing all he can to reinforce Belarusian independence. His concerns were well illustrated in the elections’ propaganda campaign. While in the past, government posters emphasised economic progress and social stability, this year, the billboards boasted Belarusian soldiers, with slogans such as “Standing on the Guard of Belarusian Independence”. More importantly, Lukashenko has recently rejected Russian designs at a new army base in Belarus, retorting, rather prosaically, that Belarus “doesn’t need it”.

This geopolitical shift is also reflected in the sudden thaw in the relations between the EU and Belarus. While the support of the respect of human rights abroad is an important aspect of EU’s foreign policy, Lukashenko has not done enough to deserve this immediate change of European attitude towards his country. Rather Lukashenko has played his cards well, and managed to place himself in a position wherein he is at the same time universally disliked and yet indispensable. According to Radio Free Europe’s Brian Whitmore,

At home, he has turned himself into a bulwark against domination by Moscow. For Moscow, he’s turned himself into a last line of defence against a pro-Western Coloured Revolution in Belarus. For the West, he has made himself useful as a counterweight to Moscow.

This thaw may, therefore, actually be a rare example of pragmatism, strategy, and long-sightedness in the EU’s foreign policy. The removal of sanctions is a concrete concession, designed to bring Putin’s erstwhile vassal closer to the EU’s sphere of influence. For once, it seems, the EU has decided to seize the day.

It has made a good first step, and should continue in this strategy. It should support Lukashenko’s every liberalising step, and offer concrete financial and other rewards in exchange. In this way, Belarus would decrease its dependency on Russia further. At the same time, the EU should keep pushing for increased respect for human rights, and threaten Lukashenko with an immediate and stricter imposition of sanctions, should he backtrack.

This will have the effect of isolating Russia, but it will not change Belarus. It is crucial to keep in mind that in Belarus Lukashenko holds genuine, overwhelming support of the population. If the EU also aims at promoting human rights and democratic principles, therefore, the education of the younger generation of Belarusians is the only way of shifting the country westwards. The EU should support, with financial and political means, the efforts of Belarusian civil society, independent media and NGOs. There are some interesting projects going on such as Dutch-Polish Russian language TV project, which is designed to counter Russian propaganda. This has high potential, since most Belarusians get their information precisely from Russian language TV.

These are long term plans. For now, we should support any country, and any dictator, who has made even a symbolical gesture at a departure from Putin’s inner circle.

Image by United Nations Photo, taken from flickr

Politics & The World

by Yannic Bellino

It is a familiar phenomenon: Something – a crisis, a catastrophe, a war – surfaces in the news and then for days, weeks, months on end it seems to be the only “hot” topic there is. It is all over all sorts of media. But then something else happens – a crisis, a catastrophe, a war – and all of a sudden the previous hot topic turns “cold”.

In the last months, we could definitely observe that: Syria, Ukraine, Greece, the Mediterranean Sea, the EU’s Eastern borders, Syria again. A rapid succession of places and the topics connected to them turning hot to the detriment of the previously hottest topic. I want to focus on Ukraine and how it has receded into the background in the face of the Syrian war and the refugee crisis.

Why has mainstream media attention shifted away from Ukraine?

I believe that there are at least two plausible narratives for Ukraine turning cold in the eyes of the media. One is connected to information as a marketed good and media outlets catering to consumer preferences, the other is rooted in geopolitical strategy, security concerns and Putin’s media-savviness.

Let’s start with the information market. Firstly, it is important to realize that media do not precisely depict reality and events, but rather filter it and shape meaning. Secondly, different media outlets compete with one another for consumers. From these two assumptions it makes sense to assume that media will depict reality and shape meanings in a way that appeals to a number of consumers as big as possible in order to maximize profits. So, what do consumers demand? What do we as society value when engaging with media? We do not want to be bored.

The relatively quick succession of dramatic events certainly is a good recipe against boredom. Media outlets know that. So they present this picture of reality. The catastrophe that is currently ‘en vogue’ is the refugee crisis. To some extent, we also hear more again about the war in Syria, mainly due to its connection with the crisis. Does that mean that the Greek crisis is solved? Certainly not. Does that mean things are back to normal in Ukraine? No. But in our fast paced world these topics are old and boring. Nobody – or hardly anybody – has the nerve to constantly hear about one and the same protracted problem for which no feasible solution seems to be nearing.

Another explanation is offered by geopolitics. This narrative departs from the vantage point of the media taking on a more noble role, namely that of a less self-interested messenger. Geopolitical considerations have shifted world leaders’ attention elsewhere – not least to Putin’s clever instrumentalization of the fight against ISIS – and, hence, media attention has also shifted.

A political director at Ukraine’s foreign ministry is quoted in a recent Politico article, claiming that “Russia tries to influence and bind countries to Russia by spreading instability all around: creating frozen conflicts — Transnistria Abkhazia, Donbas — as a way to stop those countries developing on their own”. This would mean that fading media interest in the Ukraine crisis is perfectly in line with Putin’s geopolitical goals. More evidence to this end is offered by the fact that at his UN General Assembly speech earlier this week, Putin chose to focus on everything but Ukraine. He thereby managed to deflect the attempt of multiple speakers, most notably Petro Poroshenko, to put Ukraine at the top of the agenda again.

Instead, he put emphasis on Syria and the fight against ISIS. He has a significant geopolitical interest in stabilizing the Assad regime, his ally. The interests are military and economic (Russian oil and gas companies are active in the region). Moreover, Russian Muslims joining ISIS and then returning at a later point pose an internal security threat, especially in the Caucasus where the situation is already uneasy.

From a geopolitical point of view Ukraine is not a priority for Russia anymore and Putin manages quite well to focus international attention elsewhere. The West – despite the different rhetoric – has for a while now de facto tolerated the annexation of Crimea and Russian military involvement in Eastern Ukraine. Putin knows how to play the geopolitical game. He goes back and forth just enough to keep the international community in a state of relative inertia. He is ruthless. He is charismatic. He is clever. He is good with the media. He is definitely not boring. People like that. So, his voice will be heard.

You be the judge on which narrative is more plausible. I myself believe that – as so often with complex issues – the truth lies somewhere in the middle. In any case, the fact remains that the Ukrainian crisis is not solved (except for Putin maybe, if he indeed seeks a frozen conflict).

The media and – not least – the people need to overcome the one-issue-at-a-time approach. A focus on one hot topic does not do justice to globalized, complexly interdependent world politics.

There are talks held today in Paris between Putin, Poroshenko, Merkel & Co. Did you know that? It is doubtful whether much will be achieved. Putin knows he has to offer his pinky finger every once in a while in order to appease the international community. Yet, expansion remains expansion, annexation remains annexation, and violence remains violence.

The UNHCR is worried about the situation in Ukraine. In 2014, they counted over 800 000 internally displaced persons. Last week their staff was expelled from the Lugansk region. If the conflict flares up again more strongly, with all its adverse effects on the (Eastern) Ukrainian population, mass migration to the EU could follow. Maybe mainstream media will pay more attention to Ukraine again then … if refugees are still a hot topic that is.

In any case, I believe it to be dangerous to slowly but surely accept the new status quo. Anders Fogh Rassmussen and Barack Obama have in recent days warned that accepting Russia’s expansion will erode the (supposedly) established respect for sovereignty in the post-world-war era. But maybe that is just too boring.

 

Picture by Sasha Maksymenko, taken from flickr