NATO

Politics & The World

by Fabien Segnarbieux

On December 2nd, 2015, Montenegro officially received its invitation to join NATO as the 29th member. Stirring anger not only in Russia but also in the country itself, the NATO question reveals the problems faced by the young Balkan state.

Trying to avoid an escalation of violence as it occurred in Ukraine, US ambassador to NATO Douglas Lute tried to play down such invitation: ‘This is not designed as a message to Russia. It is not about Russia’ but this was in vain, as demonstration broke out in Montenegro itself.

On December 14th, several thousand people took to the streets in Podgorica to denounce the invitation. Violent demonstrations had already taken place in the Montenegrin capital against the government but also against NATO integration the previous October.

Taking a walk on “the West side” is however nothing new for Montenegro, as this invitation is the crowning of its mid-term policy. Montenegrin officials have been trying to enhance their national identity and sovereignty especially vis-à-vis its Serbian bigger brother.

Key elements such as language (the official language is Montenegrin and not Serbian), the alphabet (Montenegrin mostly uses Latin instead of Cyrillic) and religion (Montenegro has its own church) show a commitment to an independent Montenegrin national identity.

With 22 out of 35 chapters of negotiations open, the country is farther ahead in its European integration process than Serbia. Unlike Serbia, Montenegro also backed EU economic sanctions against Russia. Thus, the Montenegrin desire to join NATO can be seen as a diplomatic tool to increase national consciousness. While Serbia does not wish to join the alliance yet, Montenegro is turning its back on Serbia and Russia, therefore affirming its sovereignty.

Yet behind this top-down process orchestrated by Montenegrin officials lie issues that explain the current controversy in Montenegrin society.

Firstly, Russia is a heavy-weight investor in Montenegro. Russia counts for nearly a third of foreign direct investment (1.1 billion in 2013) while western European countries account for less than 5 % on an individual basis[1]. In a country where tourism stands for more than 20 % of GDP[2], 30 % of nights in hotels are booked by Russian tourists[3].

Secondly, the burden of history still prevails. Russia has been an ally for several centuries and supported Montenegro (at that time Former Yugoslavia) during the 1999 NATO air strike. For a country in which 30 % of its citizens declare themselves as “Serbs”, the country’s turning away from Russia is especially hard to swallow.

Likewise, a recent poll showed a totally divided public opinion on the question with 36.3 % in favour, 37.3 % against and 26.1% unsure[4]. The government is however unwilling to hold a referendum to bring an end to this quarrel and is determined to maintain is top-down approach

Having been in power for 25 years, the Montenegrin Prime Minister Milo Đukanović has set up a political-mafia system[5] that stirs anger in all parts of society. Confusion between NATO integration and rejection of Đukanović’s system is likely to occur in case of a referendum, and this explains the reluctance of the Prime Minister to play all in on such a crucial question.

This is therefore where the Montenegrin “West Side story” stands, Behind NATO integration lies Đukanović’s system. On one hand, to force NATO integration would be to exacerbate the divisions in a society that could react violently. On the other hand, to hold such a referendum would put the current political system in Montenegro at risk. More than a journey to the West, the NATO question reveals all the divisions of the young Balkan state, making its near future very unpredictable.

Image by Defence Images, taken from flickr

 

[1] http://www.forbes.com/sites/kenrapoza/2015/11/30/despite-montenegros-westward-ho-russian-investment-unlikely-to-dissipate

According to the Central Bank of Russia, total direct investment to Montenegro hit $1.1 billion in 2013 and 32% of that came from the registered foreign companies that call Russia home. Russia is Montenegro’s biggest investor, followed by neighboring Serbia (15.69%), Ukraine (6.56%) and China (4%).

[2] http://www.balkaneu.com/montenegros-tourism-year-contributed-20-gross-domestic-product/

[3] http://www.economist.com/news/europe/21683967-montenegros-accession-fills-one-few-remaining-gaps-western-alliance

[4] http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/montenegro-mps-to-debate-nato-membership-resolution-08-19-2015#sthash.DlLAII3e.dpuf

[5] https://www.occrp.org/personoftheyear/2015/index.html

The OCCRP (Organization Crime and Corruption and Reporting Project) has elected him criminal of the year 2015 for the building of “one of the most dedicated kleptocracies and organized crime havens in the world”

Politics & The World

by Filip Rambousek

On the 30th of October, the EU has gone through with its promise to temporarily lift sanctions against Belarus. More specifically, the EU will for four months raise its travel ban on 170 individuals, as well as its asset freeze of three entities in Belarus.

The promise to raise these sanctions was a carrot dangled in front of Lukashenko before the recent elections. In exchange, Lukashenko had to respond with some degree of liberalisation of his regime.

In concrete terms, the EU demanded slightly more democratic elections, and a release of some political prisoners. Lukashenko made good on both expectations. In August, he released six political prisoners. Before the elections, he allowed the only opposition candidate, Tatsiana Karatkevich, to be interviewed by the main government newspaper. During the elections, the OSCE’s observes were met with fewer obstacles to carry out their work than previously. Overall, the OSCE cited “positive developments” in the Belarusian electoral process.

Still, Lukashenko has not suddenly become a dedicated democrat. The political prisoners, while physically out of jail, remain under close government supervision, with many of their civil liberties curtailed. Despite the improvements, we also cannot speak about democratic elections in Belarus. Belarusian civil society representatives complained about non-transparent vote counting. The OSCE’s head observer agreed, stating that “it is clear that Belarus still has a long way to go towards fulfilling its democratic commitments”.

But why should an authoritarian like Lukashenko, after 21 years in charge, and who even without the rigging of votes has the genuine support of around 60% of Belarusians, bother with pleasing the West? The answer is simple: Europe has changed, and its last dictator with it. In fact, Lukashenko has long lost the right to this moniker. This title has been, yet again, rightfully claimed by the leader of Russia. Putin’s regime, with its domestic repression and foreign aggression, currently represents the biggest threat to the EU, as well as the global order. In reality, he is now one of the “better” dictators in the authoritarian pantheon.

Lukashenko is a shrewd, cold pragmatist, whose only goal is to stay in power. He is very well aware of the threat that the new doctrine of Putinism presents to his position in Belarus. With his invasion of Ukraine, Putin has declared that he has the right to get involved in the internal affairs of any country with a Russian minority. Because of this, Belarus is obviously a prime candidate for the Russian army’s next trip abroad. To Lukashenko, a slight liberalisation of the regime represents a lesser evil, and a lesser threat to his power, than a further deterioration of his relations with the West and total dependency on Russia.

Lukashenko is therefore doing all he can to reinforce Belarusian independence. His concerns were well illustrated in the elections’ propaganda campaign. While in the past, government posters emphasised economic progress and social stability, this year, the billboards boasted Belarusian soldiers, with slogans such as “Standing on the Guard of Belarusian Independence”. More importantly, Lukashenko has recently rejected Russian designs at a new army base in Belarus, retorting, rather prosaically, that Belarus “doesn’t need it”.

This geopolitical shift is also reflected in the sudden thaw in the relations between the EU and Belarus. While the support of the respect of human rights abroad is an important aspect of EU’s foreign policy, Lukashenko has not done enough to deserve this immediate change of European attitude towards his country. Rather Lukashenko has played his cards well, and managed to place himself in a position wherein he is at the same time universally disliked and yet indispensable. According to Radio Free Europe’s Brian Whitmore,

At home, he has turned himself into a bulwark against domination by Moscow. For Moscow, he’s turned himself into a last line of defence against a pro-Western Coloured Revolution in Belarus. For the West, he has made himself useful as a counterweight to Moscow.

This thaw may, therefore, actually be a rare example of pragmatism, strategy, and long-sightedness in the EU’s foreign policy. The removal of sanctions is a concrete concession, designed to bring Putin’s erstwhile vassal closer to the EU’s sphere of influence. For once, it seems, the EU has decided to seize the day.

It has made a good first step, and should continue in this strategy. It should support Lukashenko’s every liberalising step, and offer concrete financial and other rewards in exchange. In this way, Belarus would decrease its dependency on Russia further. At the same time, the EU should keep pushing for increased respect for human rights, and threaten Lukashenko with an immediate and stricter imposition of sanctions, should he backtrack.

This will have the effect of isolating Russia, but it will not change Belarus. It is crucial to keep in mind that in Belarus Lukashenko holds genuine, overwhelming support of the population. If the EU also aims at promoting human rights and democratic principles, therefore, the education of the younger generation of Belarusians is the only way of shifting the country westwards. The EU should support, with financial and political means, the efforts of Belarusian civil society, independent media and NGOs. There are some interesting projects going on such as Dutch-Polish Russian language TV project, which is designed to counter Russian propaganda. This has high potential, since most Belarusians get their information precisely from Russian language TV.

These are long term plans. For now, we should support any country, and any dictator, who has made even a symbolical gesture at a departure from Putin’s inner circle.

Image by United Nations Photo, taken from flickr