European Union

Lifestyle & InnovationPolitics & The World

by Louise Bicknese

A safe and almost infallible way of banking and storing data: sounds great, doesn’t it? As it turns out, this kind of technology may be closer than we think. Blockchain, the technology behind the online currency ‘bitcoin’, is extremely hard to cheat. The numerous applications are potentially revolutionary; even chief economist Andrew Haldane of the Bank of England is enthusiastic and looks to this technology for a possible digital currency. The NASDAQ stock exchange uses Blockchain technology to regulate its pre-IPO trading of private companies. And most importantly, on the 22nd of October 2015 the European Court of Justice ruled that the bitcoin should be regarded as currency – giving it the same status as the euro. So how does it work and why is it so special?

The bitcoin used to have the image of a shady, volatile currency associated with drug deals and illegal organ transplantation. However, the fact that the bitcoin is used for these activities does not mean that the technology in itself is wrong, which is what the recent ECJ-ruling shows (bitcoin can now be converted into ‘regular’ currencies without tax obligations). This means that it has the same status as the Euro, US Dollar or UK Pound.

What makes the bitcoin so safe is that all transactions are stored in a decentralized ledger. A number of transactions are grouped into one block. Before they are grouped there, the data goes through a ‘hash’ function, which encodes it. The ‘hash’ is transferred to the header of the block and once the block is finished, it is added to the blockchain. A lot of other technological stuff is happening as well, but I won’t bother you with that. The most important thing is that the blockchain contains the information of every transaction ever made. In case of an error, for example when the same money (bitcoin) is transferred twice or someone tries to transfer a number of bitcoins which that person does not have, the new block is rejected and the transaction stopped. This way, there is no space for mistakes or fraud in the blockchain. It is the most trustworthy middle man ever.

The technology of the blockchain is not restricted to financial transactions. By adding bits and pieces of information to the blocks, other data can be stored as well, thereby creating a highly reliable, public ‘database’. The advantages are huge. Think for example of land registries, where in all too many countries there are disputes because pieces of land are registered to more than one owner. Blockchain technology makes this impossible and allows everyone at any time to check the database. Honduras, for example, has asked the American start-up Factom to use blockchains to map its country, and Greece is looking into the possibilities too.

As a matter of fact, start-ups using blockchain technology are popping up like daisies. Blockchain identification is possible thanks to companies such as OneName and Bitnation, and you can even get your own World Citizenship Passport. Ethereum is a decentralized platform to ‘build’ your own application based on blockchain technology, rendering it incapable of being censored or interfered with. Its subtitle is ‘Ethereum is how the internet was supposed to work’. Lastly, blockchain technology may be used to develop a safe method of online voting.

Of course, this technology is not completely infallible. For example, in order to keep the blockchain the way it is, the ‘mining nodes’ (which put a transaction into a block) are programmed to look for the longest way possible to get there. Because of the thousands of transactions already happening, one transaction takes hours. This would worsen if blockchain technology was to become more commonly used. Secondly, even though blockchains are incredibly hard to tamper with, this does not mean that it is impossible. Again, the technicalities are too complicated to explain here, but there will be one way or another in which the system can be manipulated. The consequences of the lack of control over this system have been demonstrated by already two kidnapping cases whose ransoms were to be paid in (the untraceable) bitcoin. However, the possibilities are so vast, that the technology should not be held back by these critiques.

The inventor of the blockchain technology, Satoshi Nakamoto, has vanished. Nobody knows who or where he is, but maybe this suits the technology that does not need a central authority. Blockchain is above all a public instrument, free from governments, churches or other control. Whether this is a good thing or not can be debated, but it certainly opens up a whole range of potential applications. What do you think: is blockchain the future?

For further reading on blockchain technology, I’d recommend the ‘Briefing: Bitcoin and blockchains’ in the Economist of Oct. 31st (pp. 21-24). To mess around with the technology yourself, see www.blockchain.info and www.blockchain.info/wallet.

Image by BTC Keychain, taken from flickr

Politics & The World

by Louise Bicknese

Populism in Europe is on the rise. In times of hardship, for example when there is an economic or a refugee crisis, calls for a scapegoat and for the strengthening of democracy whip up a lot of support. There is an interesting divide in the populism of nowadays: in Northern Europe, the populists are rather right-wing, while the populism of the South is integrated with a left-wing ideology. Why, and what are the consequences for European democracies?

First, let’s discuss what populism exactly is. Even though the parties are ideologically very different, there are a couple of things they have in common. Most of all, their appeal lies in their return to nationalism. They target the ‘common man’ among the voters, those who feel betrayed or cheated by other groups in society. This is usually paired with a severe suspicion against Europe; everything is decided by ‘Brussels’ and the loss of national sovereignty is mourned, which poses difficulties for European integration in the future. This stance may be rooted in the austerity measures by the EU, which have alienated the (self-perceived) victims of these measures.

The difference, however, lies in the choice of the scapegoat. While the North often points towards immigrants as the main culprits, the Southern populism is much more anti-establishment, as the original populism used to be. In assessing the Northern parties, I am for example talking about the Sweden Democrats, UKIP, Front National, the Dutch PVV etc.. Southern parties would include Syriza in Greece, Podemos in Spain and the Five Star Movement in Italy. Especially the latter parties enjoy major support in their respective countries, with some even in the government (most notably, of course, Syriza). Even though populist parties sometimes have huge ideological differences, their nationalism can work as a connective factor: think of Syriza forming a government with the right-wing populist party Independent Greeks.

However, populist parties do not just wreck havoc and get a lot of headlines; they also change the political discourse throughout Europe. Theirs is a discourse of anger and fear that reaches even the people who are not among their voters. Populism assumes a divide in society: one between the people and the ‘oligarchy’. They force the governing, stable parties to defend themselves against claims of elitism. Their party programme may not be the most well-grounded, but this is compensated with charisma and an aggressive rhetoric. With these characteristics, populists tend to take over debates, especially during election campaigns. Is that dangerous?

Most prominent politicians tend to think so. Herman van Rompuy called populism ‘the biggest danger to Europe’, with others calling it a ‘virus’. This distinctly negative view of populism may result from a history of totalitarian populist regimes, or from frustration of the establishment. However, there might be some advantages to populism. It reaches layers of society that normally do not participate actively in democracy. By expanding the interest of the public in their own democracy, by expanding their participation, parliament (as the outcome of their votes) can come to represent a larger part of the population, thereby increasing its own legitimacy.

It’s safe to say that populism has good effects as well as bad effects on democracy and political discourse. On the one hand, it may increase the legitimacy of the democracy, but on the other hand, the discourse of paranoia and suspicion it spreads may lead to a divide in society and an increase in tension, especially the Northern, right-wing populism. The marginalization of minorities is an important aspect that cannot be overlooked and the over-generalizing division between two seemingly homogenous groups can be dangerous in a multicultural society. A politician shaking things up a bit might not be the worst thing every now and again, but populists thrive more as opposition parties. Governing parties ought to stand above these kinds of discourse and be a little more serious.

 

Picture by Bloco, taken from flickr

Politics & The World

by Jackson Webster

In the twentieth century, Europe and the West won modern history. The century’s three great struggles —the world wars and the Cold War— which spanned the globe were unprecedentedly bloody and destructive, but the fact that they were all fought between competing European ideologies says a great deal about the infectiousness of European thinking. Europe knows this, and today Europe is so content with the universality of its model of organisation that it assumes totality; its way of life must be appealing to all. This logic is flawed.

Today’s European order has many enemies, foes whose rejection of European ideological and political dominance are demonstrating increasing traction even in the European periphery. These enemies will not be resisted by ‘Good Governance’ initiatives and soft power diplomacy.

To the South, European ideals of liberal democracy have largely failed even after the Arab Spring’s initially promising uprisings. In the Levant and Mesopotamia, a civil war is being fought effecting all facets of Arab and Islamic civilisation. It is a clash between distinctly non-European interpretations of a non-European religion.

And to the East, a resurgent Russia has demonstrated open aggression against a European ally, and many major democracies in the wider international community have failed to denounce these annexations as illegitimate, not to mention the complete failure of institutional collective security mechanisms to come to the aid of Ukraine.

Threats to European international organisation are plentiful, and Europe must stop working only to spread its model of organisation to the rest of the world, and start securing that model of organisation on its home turf. Europe needs a credible defence.

Many prominent figures of European society, from Eurocrats in Bruxelles to Ed Miliband of the Labour Party in the United Kingdom, have argued that the solution lies in European states sacrificing their national military autonomy and forming a pan-European army. The argument goes that European states can only rival the conventional military capabilities of other major regional powers such as Russia and China by combining their collective defensive capacities. This assertion is both true and false.

European militaries field some of the most advanced equipment in the world. From France’s completely networked Leclerc tank corps, to Britain’s Typhoon air superiority fighter, to the thriving Belgian small arms industry, defence technology is alive and well in Europe. Why then, considering these capabilities, have European states had such a difficult time mounting even ‘in-theatre’ military operations near Europe such as Kosovo in 1999 and Libya in 2011?

The answer is logistics. European states do not have the munitions capacity nor do they have the airlift capability required for operations outside their own territory, even when these operations are clearly within Europe or its so-called ‘periphery’.

My arguments against a European army, like tidy exam essay, will come to you in three parts. Firstly, a European army would face the exact same internal divisions, lack of commitments, funding-aversions, nationalist oppositions, and other problems which are already fighting against the European Union itself. Secondly, Europe already has a tool for integrated defence and combined arms, and it’s called NATO. Thirdly, the solution to solving NATO’s capacity problems —the logistics issued mentioned before— lie outside the continent in Europe’s increasingly estranged ally: the United States.

The first issue, the nationalist opposition such a venture would face, not only encompasses the obvious aversion to integration states which have spent the better part of a thousand years fighting amongst each other will have, but also contradicts existing national policies of military service.

European states which rely on conscription (Switzerland, Finland, Austria, Denmark, etc.) would have no moral grounds for recruiting their youth to serve under European command, and even nations with volunteer armies would be reluctant to sacrifice sovereignty over the lives of their young soldiers. Furthermore, operations in Afghanistan have showed a massive gap in operational effectiveness between states which are willing to take operational risks —Britain, France, Denmark, the Dutch— and those which are debilitatingly casualty-adverse —Germany, Spain, Italy, the Nordics—.

The second and third arguments discussed can be addressed together, as they both relate to the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. Formed following the Second World War to balance the Soviet threat, NATO was deemed irrelevant by many following the end of the Cold War. The alliance has defied its critics and survived because of a simple truth known well to a strand of political theory called Institutionalism: ‘sunk costs’. The logic is simple.

Institutions which states have spent a lot of money and time supporting are more readily adapted than replaced. These costs are called ‘sunk’ because they are the kinds of things which cannot be recovered, such as training civilian staff on specific issues relating to European collective defence or building a dedicated training facility outside Rome that the Italian Army alone would never have need for.

The more institutionalised an organisation is, the more likely it is to survive changes in the political climate. NATO has taken billions of dollars and over five decades to reach its current level of interoperability and institutionalisation. Taking all of this into account, centralising a European military under European Union command would take an immense amount of resources, the training of EU civilian staffers in security affairs, and would be a complete waste of such efforts as the structures for integrated command already exist in the form of NATO.

Additionally, as previously noted, European militaries have a logistics problem. How was this problem addressed in campaigns such as Libya and Mali? American and Canadian airlift. A European Union army would not benefit from such operational perks, and NATO already does, as both of these North American states are members.

Europe has defence issues. Those who say the continent is forever safe under the protection of European soft power ignore the army of threats —governments and non-state actors— which are aligned against Europe. Perhaps the solution to European defence lies in a stronger budgetary commitment to European militaries by national parliaments, thus convincing the Americans than Europe is serious about defence and hence channeling more of Washington’s attention and resources across the Atlantic. But this the choice of each individual European nation. France and Estonia have made it recently, but other national parliaments have not. Europe’s security questions can be tackled, but the answer does not lie in the European Union, rather in existing avenues for military cooperation.

 

 

Image by Rock Cohen.

 

Politics & The World

by Louise Bicknese

 

I am a feminist. There, I said it. The ‘F-word’ has been associated with bra-burning man-haters for a long time, but since Emma Watson’s fabulous speech for the UN and her ‘HeForShe’-campaign, gender inequality issues are back on the political agenda. And they are rightfully there. I interviewed Vĕra Jourová, Eurocommissioner for Justice, Consumers and Gender Equality, to see what the EU does and can do to tackle these issues.

One of the most important issues of gender inequality is, without a doubt, the pay gap. Research by the International Labour Organization has recently shown that, if progress towards equal payment between men and women continues at this rate, it will take 70 more years to close the gender gap in payment (Source). ‘The EU is closely monitoring the gender pay gap, and we are keeping a close eye on how equal pay laws are applied in practice‘, says Jourová. The EU is currently trying to enhance transparency in payment; in the eyes of the commissioner, this is the first step towards awareness and thus change in gender differences in payment.

However, it still happens often that women do not even get into the same positions as men because of their gender. This is called the ‘glass ceiling’: the unseen, yet unbreachable barrier that keeps minorities and women from rising to the upper rungs of the corporate ladder, regardless of their qualifications or achievements. Mrs. Jourová explains that she has experienced this herself: ‘I experienced different treatment because I am a woman. It was when I became a Minister for regional development.‘ One possible solution often proposed for this could be a quota that specifies a minimum percentage of women in, for example, management positions.

‘On average women represent only 20% of board members in Europe’s top listed companies. This doesn’t make economic sense, especially when you think that around 60% of new university graduates are women. […] Studies suggest that greater gender diversity in senior positions has the potential to improve corporate governance and boost economic performance. Progress has been slow and self-regulation by companies is clearly not doing the trick. I think companies need a push to bring about real change.‘

To help this, the Eurocommissioner aims to adopt a EU Directive in this area in order to reduce this inequality. Therefore, she advocates a strong stance on the different treatment of women with the same qualifications as their male counterparts.

Yet, this is not the only issue. Another problem on the professional level is the work-life balance. Mrs. Jourová talks about an interesting law the EU has adopted on this matter: ‘a law on parental leave that gives all parents the right to at least four months of leave, of which one month cannot be transferred to the other parent – a little nudge for men to take over childcare duties!‘ This way, men can play an important role in female emancipation as well, as they too would get the opportunity to spend more time with their families. On what men can do, commissioner Jourová is very clear:

‘It takes two to tango! Let me give you an example: men spend half as much time as women on caring for children, and they do not dare to take their paternity or parental leave. Work-life balance is not only a women’s issue. We won’t achieve gender equality at work without changing men’s and women’s attitudes at work and in the family.’

And how about gender equality on the decision-making level of the EU? Looking at the current Eurocommissioners, there are nine women and eighteen men – quite the difference. However, as Mrs. Jourová explains, there has already been some progress in this field, thanks to ‘former Commission President Barroso and current President Juncker who called on Member States to nominate more female commissioners. The European Union pushes Member States for more gender equality and should therefore lead by example.‘ In any case, there is no gap in payment between Eurocommissioners, fortunately.

One thing is for sure however: change does not come about automatically. Women and men as well should keep working on gender inequality issues, it is ‘not just a question of time‘, commissioner Jourová says, urging women to play their part, all in their own way. Unfortunately, regardless of all the progress on paper, this still often differs from the real world. Mrs. Jourová realises this as well, but plans to tackle this problem head-on:

‘We should “finish the unfinished business”, close the gaps in pay, employment, pensions and decision-making. Our policies should build on the past achievements and meet the new challenges. For this, I want to continue to use the full range of our instruments: legislation and its enforcement, financial support, mutual learning and awareness-raising activities.’

An important trap we should not fall in, is letting this issue become one in which different ideologies oppose each other. It is, in her eyes, a policy priority in its own right. Mrs. Jourová is a feminist, just like all her male colleagues, who joined the HeForShe campaign. In fact, she mentions that nearly all EU citizens are actually feminist, since most European citizens believe that equality between men and women is a fundamental right and that tackling this inequality should be a priority for the EU.

Lastly, Mrs. Jourová gives inspiring advice:

‘If you want to reach top positions, go and get what you want. It is your call, fight for it. Develop the right skills, expertise, and networks, and let others know what you can bring to the board/political party. Seek mentors and sponsors with board connections (or in political parties), show strong performance and ask for assignments that increase your global experience and knowledge.’

And you? What do you think? Are you a feminist?

 

 

I want to thank Mrs. Jourová for the time and effort of answering the questions.

Career & Education

by Louise Bicknese

 

Getting a job right after you are done with your education – sounds great, right? It used to be quite normal, but it is not today. Youth unemployment is at a peak and it has several causes. The European Union tries to tackle some of those with the ‘Youth Guarantee’. It focuses on getting people under 25 to ‘do something’ within 4 months after their leaving education or getting fired: either with a job, an apprenticeship, a traineeship or continued education. But what exactly is this guarantee, how is it implemented, and does it really bring about significant change?

The EU Commission has accepted the proposal for this youth guarantee. It is, in their words, ‘both a structural reform to drastically improve school-to-work transitions and a measure to immediately support jobs for young people‘. Their plan is to improve cooperation between all actors involved. A key role is reserved for the PESs: the Public Employment Services. They should work together with social services, firms, and educational facilities, among others, to include young people in their project and find them jobs or educational or apprentice opportunities.

One of the main problems in youth unemployment is the vast amount of so-called NEETs. These are youths that are Not Employed, in Education nor in Training. The problem with them is, they are not registered anywhere, so it is hard to reach them. That is why the Guarantee wants PESs to cooperate with social services as well, so they can include these NEETs.

Each country can implement this plan in their own way. For example, the Netherlands focuses on a policy which reduces the number of early school dropouts, while Germany has to work on its equality of job opportunities; socio-economic background still plays a role there. However, a lot more work has to be done by countries that deal with a significantly higher youth unemployment rate, such as Italy and Croatia. They get help from the Youth Employment Initiative, which provides subsidiaries.

The main problem with this plan is that it is battling symptoms. Instead of looking at the core of the problem, the Youth Guarantee deals with its consequences. The big issue is that, one, universities apparently do not prepare young people well enough for their jobs, and two, too many people choose a field of study in which there are not enough jobs. These problems ask for a different kind of reform: changing the programmes and courses at university and informing the prospective students better about the chances on the labour market for different fields of study.

However, the Youth Guarantee does no such thing. It tries to battle the youth unemployment problems by taking on the youth that is the victim of these circumstances, rather than changing the circumstances themselves. They offer opportunities for extra schooling or training, when this should be incorporated in their previous education – extra education should not even be necessary. Even though this plan might – and I will return to that later – help the people who need that right now, it does not bring about the structural reform needed to prevent these youths from ever falling into this gap.

Regarding the effectiveness of the plan itself; this article poses some doubt to that as well. Since the economic crisis, the number of ‘zero-hours contracts’ has risen enormously. These contracts do not specify a certain amount of hours worked by the employee, but rather means that the employee can be called upon to work anything between full-time hours and not at all – zero hours. This is an extremely insecure form of employment and not a stable income at all.

This does not necessarily mean that zero-hours contracts are pure evil: they can be quite useful for, for example, part-time jobs for students. The difference is that in these cases, it is a part-time job next to university, while for the youths in question it would be preferably full-time. What adds to the instability of these contracts, is that once a company hits a low, the employees with such a contract are the first ones out.

Now it would be harsh to say that all youths helped by the Youth Guarantee will get a zero-hours contract, but realistically speaking, a lot will. The success numbers of for example Finland are only based on whether the young people get a job, not on how long they stay with it. Therefore, it is very likely that for most youths, the Youth Guarantee is nothing but a short-term solution that does not call for the structural reform needed.

Videos

 

Each year, hundreds of thousands of European students migrate, looking for a better future and stable jobs.

 

Some flee the economic misery at home, others search for new experiences. Some will come back, others won’t.

Student migration has become reality for Europe. But how will it shape the future of our continent? How can we channel its effects? And what role are the European institutions playing in all of this?

What our latest episode on how students are Fleeing the Crisis.

Politics & The World

by Fabien Segnarbieux

Inheriting decades of Yugoslav non-alignment policy, Serbia is trying to follow a neutral diplomacy that satisfies its two biggest partners: The European Union and the Federation of Russia – but for how much longer? Indeed, this balance is endangered by the conflict in Ukraine that may force Serbia to take a side.

Despite being an official candidate country for EU accession, Serbia has refused to join European sanctions against Russia. The reason resides in the “special relationship” existing between Serbia and its Russian older brother. Before becoming an EU member state, Serbia still has a long way to go and questions are raised concerning the viability of such a diplomacy. Serbia is sitting between two chairs at the same time.

Based on a shared culture linked to orthodox Christianity, Russia and Serbia have been allies for several centuries. Already during the times of Ottoman rule on the Balkans, Russia´s stance was clear – the defence of Orthodox Christianity in the region. Beyond this humanist principle however, there was also a geopolitical incentive: maintaining a double pressure on the Ottoman Empire. Firstly by defending Orthodox Christians and fuelling the opposition, and secondly by frequently waging wars to destabilize Ottoman borders and to get direct access to the Mediterranean Sea.

In these ways, Russian diplomacy held a key influence in the foundation of a Serbian state. It freed Serbia from the Ottoman rule in the 1830s, before allowing the establishment of a modern state of Serbia after the Russo-Turkish war of 1877-1878.

More recently, Russia condemned the NATO bombing of Yugoslavia during the Kosovo war and does still not recognize Kosovo’s independence. Furthermore, a free trade agreement between both states has been in effect since 2000, and Russia frequently backs up Serbian economy by allowing loans with low interest rates.

Thus, ties between the two states are strong and important; Serbia needs Russia and its support on many sensitive issues such as the Kosovo, whereas Serbia remains the main ally of Russia in the Balkans. Without overestimating the importance of this relation, there exists a special relationship and one should know that any EU integration process will be confronted to that situation de facto.

Likewise, the European Union has always been the main economic partner of Serbia. Today, almost 90% of all Serbian exports go to Europe; joining the EU is thus a key national interest of Serbia. On the other hand, having Serbia as a member state is a key step for achieving and maintaining pacified Balkans, and would spread EU influence further across the region.

A clear « ménage à trois » is happening currently, and it is in each actor’s interest to achieve a « Russia friendly » integration of Serbia within the European Union. However, all the events happening in Ukraine are not only endangering that trio but making it more and more difficult to maintain.

Firstly, Crimea’s annexation raised concerns in the Serbian camp because it was a strong reminder of the Kosovo issue. What made things worse, Putin directly mentioned Kosovo as a « precedent » that led to Crimea. Consequently, Serbia was concerned by this; it could affect Russian support for the Serbian position on Kosovo, and help legitimize Kosovo’s independence.

Secondly, the EU voted in favour of sanctions against Russia and officially asked Serbia to join them. Unfortunately, European officials had underestimated a cold fact: it is hard to ask a country to back up sanctions if it has endured them itself in the past. If we add the fact it would have been against their Russian « brothers », we can deem this request either risk-taking or ideological, but in every way inconsiderat.

Finally, the cancellation of the South Stream project has economically harmed Serbia and has scrapped the energy cooperation with Russia. Serbian PM Alexandar Vucic clearly stated that “Serbia has been investing in this project for seven years, but now it has to pay the price of a clash between the great [powers].”

But what if the decision-makers where from the grass-roots level, the citizens of Serbia? In late 2013, Nova srpska politička misao had carried out a survey regarding EU integration and cooperation with Russia, and the results may raise concerns over Serbians’ real willingness to join the EU:

“70 percent of the Serbian population favour close relations with Russia, while 50 percent support Serbia’s accession to the European Union. Only 30 percent see a contradiction in this, declaring that they decidedly support close relations with Russia instead of joining the EU”

In the end, although Serbia is “caught between two chairs”, the best solution would be to maintain the situation. However, the real question is whether this is actually a realistic goal? An alternative solution would be to put the question of foreign policy harmonization aside for a while. Unfortunately, this is unlikely to happen.

Indeed, the first draft of a resolution on Serbia prepared by European Parliament reporter David McAllister has leaked and was clear: “We invite Serbia to align its foreign and security policy with the EU’s, including the part referring to Russia, with a regret that Serbia did not join restrictive measures [imposed] on Russia.”

 

Politics & The World

by Louise Bicknese

Lately, with the process of increasing European integration, votes have gone up to develop a common European migration policy. The advantages are obvious: more clarity for the immigrant, a more regular distribution of immigrants over all member states (right now, 50% of immigrants go to 5 of the 28 member states), and less refugees getting lost in or out of the system and ending up on the streets. So why is it not here yet?

The answer is simple. A common policy 1) would be quite a harsh intrusion of states’ sovereignty and 2) the collection of European migration policies is incredibly diverse. Even within member states, immigration is a popular subject of debate and a headliner on political party programmes. Migration policies in the European Union comes in all sorts and flavours and right now, it is difficult to see an extensive common policy developing through so many different opinions. Point number one could be refuted by Article 63a in the Treaty of Lisbon, which gives the Union the right and competence to ‘develop a common immigration policy aimed at ensuring, at all stages, the efficient management of migration flows, fair treatment of third-country nationals residing legally in Member States…’[]

Point number two, however, invites a more complicated debate. First of all, countries who are dealing with a less severe immigration problem have no incentive to participate in the ‘burden sharing’ which Mr. Schulz, President of the European Parliament is so eagerly encouraging. This is already visible in the stance of the Dutch State Secretary of Justice, Fred Teeven, who is of the opinion that we should not necessarily aid boat refugees on the Mediterranean Sea, but rather offer help in the conflicted regions themselves – a very different opinion than the ones generally offered by European officials and politicians of southern European member states, who face this problem every day.

Then there is the ever-returning problem of diversity in member states’ policy. To illustrate this, we may look at Denmark, France and Germany and the focus of their immigration and integration policies. Denmark, for example, relies heavily on economic integration as the means but also as the goal of integration. This is combined with relatively closed borders; they almost never allow family or marriage migration, for example. Sanctions will be enacted if an immigrant does not show enough effort in finding a job. In France, however, it is a taboo to make a law for one specific group (in this case, immigrants or minorities) because of their historically essential ideas of equality and brotherhood. They spend a lot of money and resources on a contract between immigrant and state and target the first five years of residence in France as an important phase in integration. Lastly, Germany has some problems coordinating its policy between the national and regional level and the very important NGO’s. Their focus lies mainly with youth: 25% of immigrants are below 25. It is however interesting to see that Germany already has problems coordinating its policy within the state; imagine what kind of problems this could cause when applied to the entirety of Europe.

Even though most Western European countries are struggling with immigration problems and the call for a European policy is understandable, it is hard to see or predict which form this policy would have. Is it possible to find consensus between member states whose problems are quite different, say Spain and Finland? Spain houses 14,77% of non-EU immigrants while Finland stays at just 0,58%. The original nationalities of these immigrants differ as well: Spain’s foreign citizens are mostly from Morocco, Ecuador and Colombia. In Finland, however, they are mostly from Afghanistan, Iraq, Thailand, Somalia and China.

Different groups of immigrants have different needs and the European Union has to avoid the trap of making a policy which is too generalizing. This lack of attention to specific needs for different kinds of immigrants could possibly hurt them even more than the current system. However, if the policy is too complicated, the current despised bureaucracy could become even worse.

From these observations, the conclusion can be drawn that even though a common European migration policy could solve a lot of problems, the content of this law will be subject to a lot of discussion. Finding a balance between diversity and unity requires quite a lot of rope-balancing and the needs of the member states will often be in conflict with the needs of immigrant. A common policy would be a befitting next step in integration – nevertheless, the migration problem is probably one of the hardest to be tackled.

Politics & The World

The last European elections were special. For the first time, each party group nominated a candidate for Commission President. Among my fellow European Studies students at Maastricht University this raised much excitement. It was widely seen as a step in the fight against the much debated democratic deficit and for endowing the Commission with more popular trust – a vital resource in a democracy, especially when the link between decision-makers and the electorate is as indirect as in the European Union. For the European project to succeed in the future, heightening the level of trust in the EU is of utmost importance.

Before I go on, let me tell you some things about myself. I study and live in Maastricht, a vibrant, international, student city. During my first year of studies, I lived in Belgium, crossing the Dutch-Belgian border every day and driving home to Germany every other weekend. The administrative effort of studying in the Netherlands and living in Belgium was minimal. Moreover, I just got back from an Erasmus semester in France, also with close to no paperwork involved at all.

During these last years, I came to realize what European integration really meant. I started taking pride in the fact that the EU won the 2009 Nobel Peace Prize. I am aware that it was European integration that – after the horrors of two world wars – ended the ever-present bloodshed on our continent. I feel truly European. By now you might have guessed (or maybe feared) it: I am a federalist. Yeah, I said that. Hence, the remarks that follow are, of course, biased, but I firmly believe in them and I wish to share them.

Back to the European elections: The European People’s Party emerged as winner and, therefore, Jean Claude Juncker as designated Commission President. How exciting! The first more or less directly elected Commission President (even if it was not my preferred candidate) was about to assume office. But, initially, not many outside of my European Studies bubble seemed to really care. Another random politician was elected to a random position. It was only some months later, with the Lux leaks scandal, that Juncker got confronted with full-blown, mainstream, first-five-minutes-of-the-news media attention – and, hence, with widespread public interest. The new scandal then fit perfectly with the popular image of the EU as a strange entity composed of corrupted elites that could not be trusted.

The first quasi-directly elected President of the European Commission, who ideally should stand for consensus-building, cooperation and European solidarity, exposed to have enacted tax-avoidance schemes to reap gains for Luxemburg to the detriment of other member states. Politically, this is what we call a “Super-GAU” in German (meaning the greatest possible accident, the term was originally introduced to refer to the threat of accidents in nuclear power plants). Of course, the right-wing Eurosceptics in the European Parliament, who won unprecedented support in the last election, were not hesitating a second to feast on the meal that had been prepared for them. And as so often, those who yelled the loudest were being heard.

UKIP’s Nigel Farage organized a motion of censure against Juncker, and he and his FN and AfD colleagues made sure to feed the media with some quotable, easily understandable stuff about the nonsensical nature of European integration to print and broadcast. A motion of censure against a Commission President that has just assumed office, paired with media-savvy populist parliamentarians, is – in terms of trust – let’s say, not ideal. The fact that Juncker in the vote then received even more support than in the initial vote of investiture did not find much attention. The damage was done.

However, this whole scandal might also offer an opportunity. To use it Juncker now has to follow up on his announcements to tackle the lack of fiscal harmonization that made the controversial tax-scheme possible. Although often forgotten, Luxembourg was is not a single case. Countries such as Ireland, the UK, and Austria used similar schemes. Debates about a common corporate tax base had have been around for a while. With the electorate momentarily focused on the issue however, the Commission should now use this attention and push for advances in this field. This is the way Juncker should present it: Here is a problem that affects all of us. This is what we are going to do collectively to solve it! Of course, there will be many objections to this. After all, fiscal policies are at the heart of national sovereignty. Time for Juncker to assert himself! He should be wise and use the public pressure that the scandal generated to his advantage.

 

 

Image by European People’s Party.

 

Videos

Two out of three Europeans do not trust the EU. In some countries, it is even 80%.

But why is this? And what does it mean for us young Europeans? To find out the answers to these questions, tune in to our latest episode of Campus Europe.

During our first episode we visit the European Commission, and talk to Mr Soufflot de Magny who shows us how trust in the EU is measured, and what the role of the EU public opinion analysis is. Afterwards, we will jump to our corresponding Student TVs TVAAC from Coimbra in Portugal and Tudeng TV from Tallinn in Estonia, who give us insights into the situation in their respective countries. They have made it their task to see what students think about the EU, and where they see potential problems.

Finally, we go all the way to Maastricht in the Netherlands where the local student TV BreakingMaas held a very insightful interview with Prof. Shackleton, who explains what has affected the European Trust and what the EU has to do before people lose their faith in it completely.